Leveraged investors may be subject to contagion when sales of repossessed collateral create a downward spiral in re sales prices, increasing margin requirements and drying up the supply of liquidity. This raises the question whether market integration is desirable when the risk of contagion is signicant. While a policy that erects barriers to the free ow of liquidity across countries (fragmentation) can mitigate the incidence of contagion, it creates another problem: Liquidity may remain idle in one country while its neighbour suers a nancial crisis. We conduct a welfare analysis to net out the two eects. We show that, by itself, fragmentation has a negative welfare eect: It can only fend o mild nancial crises, at the cost of exposing the country to more severe ones. At the same time, since liquidity is under-provided in a competitive equilibrium, governments should inject more of it, which could involve fragmentation, in some cases. Nevertheless, in the absence of coordination, governments are likely to fragment over and above the social optimum. Such sub-optimal fragmentation is particularly likely when governments become massive suppliers of liquidity. It follows that the recent increase in fragmentation may reect the implementation of beggar-thy-neighbour policies rather than the proper treatment of market failures.
Introduction
It has long been recognized that the failure of one high-leverage investor, such as a bank or a hedge fund, may create a negative spillover eect for other investors. Such contagion may occur for various reasons, for example, direct exposure (Allen and Gale, 2000) , wealth eects (Kyle and Xiong, 2001 ), downward spirals in margin requirements and collateral prices (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, Suarez and Sussman, 1997), or portfolio constraints (Pavlova and Rigobon, 2008) . The risk of contagion has led researchers (e.g., Stiglitz, 2010 ) and policy makers to question the benets of the international integration of capital markets. It seems that the drive for a fragmentation policy strengthens in the wake of a nancial crisis, and the crisis that started in 2007 is no exception. According to The Economist (2013, p.6) cross-border banks were an important channel for transmitting the mortgage crisis in America... to other countries. To limit such spillovers... regulators around the world are seeking to ring-fence their banking systems.
Apart from a need to evaluate specic regulatory measures, a deeper question remains poorly understood: Is market integration desirable in an environment that features signicant risk of contagion? To put it dierently, is the regulatory and policy drive towards less integration justied on welfare grounds, or is it an instance of coordination failurethe old beggar-thy-neighbour problem? And what is the relation between massive injections of public liquidity and nancial market fragmentation? In this paper we evaluate fragmentation and liquidity supply policies via an exact welfare accounting that weighs the benets of avoiding contagion against the costs of the inecient use of funds due to fragmentation.
To that end, we construct a two-country model in which contagion results from a downward spiral in collateral value leading to tighter margin requirements and the drying up of liquidity (for a succinct description see Krishnamurthy, 2010) . Liquidity is provided by speculators who prot from low re sale prices in times of nancial crisis due to cashin-the-market pricing of assets (Allen and Gale, 1994) . Fire sales of investment goods are a direct consequence of debt secured by collateral, as in Hart and Moore (1998) . International contagion is an immediate eect of both countries sharing a market for liquidity.
Although contracts are optimally negotiated between debtors and creditors (given market prices), neither the amount nor the price of repossessed investment goods is a reection of their social value. As a result, competitive markets are grossly inecient, liquidity is a public good and, as such, underprovided in a competitive equilibrium. Governments may provide extra liquidity subject to a capacity constraint that captures tax distortions.
The macro shock is continuous and captures the fraction of investors in each country that need access to external funding. Country shocks are uncorrelated, so that fragmentation may lead to one country suering a nancial crisis while liquidity stands idle with its neighbour.
Our rst major result is that when the trade-o between contagion avoidance and the ineciency due to idle liquidity is properly accounted for, the former is dominated by the latter. As already hinted above, fragmentation fends o nancial crisis for some realizations of shocks, but for others, it prevents access to idle liquidity. We show that the former (positive) eect applies to mild shocks while the latter (negative) eect applies to more severe ones. Intuitively, each country by itself can fend o only relatively mild shocks with its limited resources. Fending o severe shocks would require its own liquidity and that of its neighbour, which the latter can provide in the lucky event that it suers only a relatively mild shock. In other words, fragmentation tends to substitute mild nancial crises for relatively severe ones. It follows that the net welfare eect of fragmentation is negative when the two sets of events have the same probabilities. We also show that when speculators are the only source of liquidity, competition keeps the crisis probability constant, with or without fragmentation. In this case fragmentation unambiguously reduces welfare.
A second result is that fragmentation raises concerns about policy coordination along the lines of the old beggar thy neighbour argument (Stiglitz, 1999) . When a country restricts the free ow of liquidity to avoid contagion, it ignores the eect its own idle liquidity has on the welfare of its neighbour. While fragmentation is sometimes socially optimal (i.e. increases welfare in both countries), the propensity to fragment unilaterally is always (weakly) stronger than justied by joint welfare maximization. Hence, it is possible that the recent increase in market fragmentation is a coordination failure rather than rejection of a market integration dogma. As The Economist (2013, p.6) puts it, Regulators around the world...have since [the crisis] tried to reduce the threat of a big bank collapse..., but many of these eorts have undermined banks' incentive and ability to do business across borders. For example, domestic regulators used to allow foreign banks to rely on capital, liquidity and regulatory oversight of the foreign parent. Now many of them are pressing units of foreign banks...to maintain sucient liquidity and capital independent of the parent.
The same article concludes that The best way to maintain nancial globalization...would be increased cooperation among regulators (p.8).
We also show that coordination problems are aggravated when massive injections of government liquidity dominate the market. When the governments rely on prot-oriented speculators to provide liquidity, the eect of fragmentation is similar to that of a tax on liquidity, which drives away speculators. In contrast, when governments take over the market, fragmentation turns into a grab of liquidity for the domestic market at the expense of the neighboring country. Our model is thus consistent with the observation that increased fragmentation tends to coincide with post-crisis periods during which governments inject large amounts of public liquidity.
Moreover, when two countries dier in their tax capacity, a greater share of the benets of pooling public liquidity is harvested by the country with the lower tax capacity. In the extreme case, it is even possible that a country with high tax capacity would lose from pooling funds while its neighbour gains. This is because for a rich country (one with a high tax capacity), the cost of idle liquidity in the poor country is low, while the risk of contagion is very high. This nding may help to explain why the issue of a banking union at the European level is so divisive.
A third major result is that although our analysis provides only limited support for fragmentation, it provides a strong support for a policy that injects liquidity over and above the competitive level. Liquidity is a public good and, as such, underprovided in a competitive equilibrium. It turns out that in some cases the injection of liquidity that is restricted for the exclusive use of the domestic market can boost the total amount of liquidity. This is because free-to-ow and domestic liquidity are imperfect substitutes. In these cases, the positive welfare eect is due to the increase in total liquidity rather than fragmentation. Put dierently, fragmentation is undesirable by itself, but may enhance welfare when used to support an injection of liquidity.
Lastly, we extend the analysis to the case in which the governments can make fragmentation contingent on the realization of the macro shock. The derived optimal (ex post) rule is reminiscent of triage, the decision rule used in emergency medicine to prioritize treatment according to the severity of the injury. In some cases, the optimal action is for a country undergoing a mild shock to give all its liquidity to its more badly-injured neighbour, but if the neighbour's shock is so severe that it cannot be rescued all liquidity should be allocated to the less severely aected country. Clearly, such rules are practical only with a strong commitment mechanism, which calls for a role for international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the European Central Bank (ECB).
The triage analysis highlights another important property of our model: Social welfare increases with the scale of liquidity, because the more liquidity is supplied, the larger is the potential nancial crisis and associated social cost avoided.
Our paper builds on the literature following Fisher (1933) (2001, 2003, 2004) apply this logic within an international nance context and show that emerging economies whose assets are not internationally pledgeable will tend to underinsure and have rms with excessive leverage. Mendoza (2010) shows that nancial amplication may help explain the deep recessions experienced by emerging economies following sudden stops in international capital ows. Korinek (2010 Korinek ( , 2011 ) extends this framework and shows that capital controls can act as a Pigouvian tax on excessive international borrowing. Unlike these papers, we focus on the international contagion of crisis, via a common and endogenously determined pool of liquidity.
Like us, Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) conduct a welfare analysis of nancial integration. They show that integration can reduce the capitalization of banks, leading them to take on more risk and therefore exposing them more to distress. Moreover, integration can lead to contagion because of cross-country exposure by banks (as in Allen and Gale, 2000) . On the other hand, integration improves liquidity coinsurance across regions. Since depositors anticipate the eects of integration, they only choose to be exposed to other banks if the above trade-o is favourable. On balance, therefore, integration increases welfare. Our paper diers in that a key driving force for our welfare eects comprises the externalities stemming from the need to liquidate investments and the impact this has on re sales prices (as in Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987, or Lorenzoni, 2008) . Moreover, we analyse the welfare implications of public liquidity injections in addition to market fragmentation. Finally, in our paper, fragmenting a market can be a country's unilateral policy choice, giving rise to coordination failures, which is not considered by Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) . Castiglionesi, Feriozzi, and Lorenzoni (2009) look into the eect that international nancial integration has on the equilibrium liquidity holdings of banks. Integration improves insurance opportunities and therefore may reduce the amount of liquidity held by banks. As a result, crises, if they occur, are more severe and interest rates more volatile.
In contrast, the main focus of our paper is on the welfare analysis of integration. In addition, we allow for the provision of publicly subsidized liquidity, which is not considered by Castiglionesi et.al. Finally, the underlying mechanism for crisis is somewhat dierent between the two models. In Castiglionesi et.al. banks can co-insure each other across regions and a systemic crisis occurs only when both regions experience a severe shock and therefore cannot insure each other. By contrast, our focus is on the eect of contagion, triggered by the fact that two countries have access to a common pool of liquidity, supplied by prot-oriented speculators.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the setting, Section 3 analyses the contract, and Section 4 develops a single-country benchmark. Section 5 presents the two-country ex post equilibrium and Section 6 presents the two-country ex ante equilibrium and the welfare analysis. Section 7 deals with the ex post optimal allocation of liquidity and Section 8 concludes.
Setting
There are four dates t = 0, ..., 3 (see Figure 1 ) and two countries i = A, B. Liquidity is a storable consumption good (the numeraire). Its opportunity cost is given by an alternative linear technology, which generates a gross income ρ 0 at t = 3 per unit of t = 0 investment. Liquidity is supplied by risk-neutral prot-oriented speculators and welfareoriented governments. All liquidity decisions are taken at t = 0. The linear technology vanishes thereafter, the investment cannot be drawn back at t = 1, 2 and the income is generated only at t = 3, upon winding up. Note the similarity to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . Speculators are competitive and wealthy, so that their supply of liquidity at t = 0 (denoted by L S ) is perfectly elastic. Any additional liquidity L G that the governments inject needs to be borrowed at the competitive rate ρ 0 and be repaid by raising taxes at t = 3. To capture the convex nature of tax distortions, suppose that lump sum taxes can fund a liquidity position up to T (for each government) but the distortions increase to innity beyond that point.
At t = 0 governments make simultaneous decisions about the rules that regulate the ow of liquidity across countries. Specically, each country can allow liquidity to ow freely or it can restrict liquidity (private or public) from owing out. 
The macro shock creates a nancial market, in which investors aected by an adverse shock to their balance sheet seek external funding from investors with surplus funds.
The demand for external funding increases with the realizations of θ i , but so does the supply. Each country is thus endowed with sucient resources to fund all its investment opportunities. Absent nancial frictions, the macro shock is purely re-distributional, with no real eects. With frictions, shocks will have a real eect. We assume that investors with surplus funds can only invest domestically. This assumption is not important since the (potential) mobility of speculators' and governments' liquidity is enough to generate all the key eects of the model.
2 Assuming a continuous distribution over the macro shock allows us to endogenize the crisis probability and to distinguish between crises of various intensities.
All projects are economically viable: They can, if carried to maturity, generate income y 2 + y 3 > ρ 0 , to be strengthened by assumption (4), below. Though total (potential) income is xed, its timing is subject to an idiosyncratic shock that is realized at t = 2. With probability 1 − π an investor's entire income is only realized at t = 3, which, as explained below, drives an externally-funded investor into nancial distress. Otherwise, income is evenly distributed, with y 2 at t = 2 and y 3 at t = 3. Income ows are noncontractible 3 resulting in an agency problem that closely resembles the treatment of Hart and Moore (1998). The advantage of this setting is that it generates optimal contracts that are easily interpreted as standard, collateralized debt contracts, a commonly perceived driver of the nancial crisis. 4 The reason for separating the macro from the idiosyncratic shock is to abstract from the issue of indexation. When the funding contract is signed (at t = 1), all macro uncertainty is already resolved, the future re sale price is perfectly foreseen and can therefore be priced into the contract.
While income is not contractible, investment goods are. It immediately follows that no payment is enforceable at t = 3. Hence, the contract species a repayment r at t = 2, and a fraction β of the investment good that is pledged as collateral. If β is seized, the investor can continue operating on a smaller scale, 1 − β. The threat of repossession is the only incentive investors have in repaying their loans. It follows that externally funded investors with no income at t = 2 are in nancial distress and would see their collateral repossessed (in equilibrium). We adopt the common assumption that the initiating investor has a productivity advantage in managing the investment, so that repossession is socially (as well as privately) costly: Following repossession the investment good can generate only a fraction δ ∈ (0, 1) of its potential income. We make the further assumption that the lender cannot hold the collateral to maturity and instead has to convert it to liquidity (or cash) at the prevailing re sale price of q ≤ δ (y 2 + y 3 ). This assumption of no settlement in kind may be justied if the lender itself is a nancial intermediary subject to agency problems vis-à-vis its creditors (depositors in the case of a bank) that do not allow postponing payment to t = 3. This motivation is not modelled explicitly here.
Note, also, that the assumption of no settlement in kind is similar to a cash in advance constraint and plays a similar role in the modelling. For simplicity, we exclude the income generated at t = 2 by non-distressed investors from the re sale market. We assume that 3 A complete contract alternative is suggested by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , but the current formalization is chosen for its simplicity. In the spirit of complete contracts, we abstract from contract renegotiation, although this could easily be incorporated into the framework. 4 See Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) for an alternative modelling approach.
the social cost of repossession is substantial:
This assumption simplies the exposition signicantly and we discuss, below, in more detail, the role it plays.
The re sale price and therefore the rate of return on hoarding liquidity for use in the re sales market is, in equilibrium, perfectly foreseen at the time of contracting (t = 1).
Moreover, speculators and rich investors are indierent between funding poor investors and hoarding their liquidity. The risk-adjusted lending rate ρ (q) at t = 1 is therefore determined by the arbitrage condition
We conclude with a few additional parametric assumptions. We assume the economic viability of projects after accounting for the deadweight loss of repossessions:
Moreover, assume
which simplies some of the derivations below.
The contract
Consider a poor investor who needs to raise external nance, of 1 − w. He negotiates a contract (r, β) to maximize his expected nal payo (before tax),
subject to the following constraints. First, the repayment, r, must be incentive compatible, so that a non-distressed investor (with a realized income of y 2 ) prefers to repay r rather than default and lose the collateral and the corresponding future income, βy 3 :
r ≤ βy 3 .
Second, the contract must satisfy the lender's participation constraint. Due to competition, that constraint holds with equality:
Third, the investor's participation constraint must be satised so that he (weakly) prefers to invest in his own project rather than lend his wealth at the rate ρ (q):
Finally, there are several feasibility constraints. The fraction of the investment good pledged as collateral must be non-negative and cannot exceed one:
Repayment must be feasible, i.e., r ∈ [0, y 2 ] , which is implied by assumption (5) and the incentive compatibility constraint (7).
Since repossession destroys value, the optimal contract should satisfy the lender's participation constraint (8) by increasing the repayment, r, and by decreasing the collateral, β, as much as possible. Hence, subject to the feasibility constraint (10), the incentive constraint (7) should hold with equality. Consider the intersection of the (binding) incentive compatibility constraint, (7) , and the lender's participation constraint, (8) , in the (r, β)-space and let
map the re sale price to the collateral, β, at that intersection point.
For a re sale price such that b (q) > 1 the feasible set of the contract problem is empty and the investor is credit rationed. Otherwise, the investor can obtain credit at a riskless rate ρ (q), pledging a share b (q) of assets as collateral. Notice that b (q) < 0: When the re sale price drops, the repayment, r, needs to be increased to satisfy the lender's participation constraint. But since the incentive constraint (7) binds, that cannot be done without an increase in collateral, β. Further insight into the workings of the contract can be obtained by substituting the lender's participation constraint (8) into the investor's objective function (6) , which yields the before-tax consumption of the poor investor
where
Intuitively, the poor investor's (before tax) consumption is the potential value of his project, net of the cost of funding, less the deadweight loss of external nance, l (q), plus his own wealth, on which he earns market interest. Note that the dead-weight loss of external nance is positive and decreasing in the re sale price: l > 0 and l < 0.
As q drops, both the feasibility constraint (10) and the investor's participation constraint (9) tighten. We show that there is a non-empty set of structural parameters such that the feasibility constraint (10) is made redundant by the investor's participation constraint (9) . In other words, we show that equilibria without credit rationing exist, which simplies the analysis signicantly. While an existence proof is postponed to the next section, we take a preliminary step here. Let q n be the fundamental re sale price
and let q c be the price at which the investor's participation constraint (9) binds:
Then we have the following lemma.
iii) For any combination of structural parameters, y 2 , y 3 , δ and π, there exists a critical value W (y 2 , y 3 , δ, π) such that for a given w > W (y 2 , y 3 , δ, π) and for any q ∈ [q c , q n ], the feasibility condition (10) 
Proof see Appendix.
The (before-tax) consumption of the rich investor is c (q) = y 2 + y 3 − ρ (q) + ρ (q) w. (15) This expression is similar to that in equation (12) except the rich investor is internally 5 We use the word consumption instead of income to avoid confusion with the project's income y 2 and y 3 . Actual consumption needs to account for taxation, which is done in the welfare accounting below. funded and, thus, need not bear the deadweight loss of external nance.
At this point we add two additional parametric assumptions:
w > W (y 2 , y 3 , δ, π) , (16) and
Note that ρ n ≡ ρ (q n ) = 1.
Single-country case
This section develops the competitive equilibrium and welfare properties of the onecountry benchmark; the country index, i, is dropped for brevity.
Consider, rst, the ex-post equilibrium, given a pre-determined supply of liquidity, L. We distinguish, below, between the case in which L is competitively supplied by speculators from that in which it is supplied by a welfare-oriented government.
An ex post equilibrium is characterized by a re sale price, q, a riskless rate ρ (q) and the contract, b (q), determined simultaneously following the realization of θ. When the participation constraint of poor investors, (9) binds, some of them might not invest in their own projects but, instead, may lend their wealth at the market rate. Let η denote the fraction of poor investors who invest in their own projects. Note that due to the arbitrage condition (3), the lending and re sale markets are cleared by a single price, q. Since an excess liquidity supply is conceivable, we write the clearing condition as an inequality:
In other words, pre-determined liquidity plus investors' surplus wealth not used for internal funding must weakly exceed the funding shortage of poor investors plus the liquidity needed to absorb re sales. Using the aggregate wealth constraint (1), we simplify the above to
We can now show the following proposition: Proposition 1. Given L, there exists an ex post equilibrium, with
Proof. When the inequality in (18) is strict, all poor investors receive funding and η = 1.
The return of liquidity drops to the rate of return on storage, namely, one. It follows that q (θ) = q n , as speculators bid up the re sale price to the fundamental value of repossessed investment goods. From (18) , such an equilibrium exists for θ ≤ θ * . Otherwise, a nancial crisis occurs and re sale prices drop to q c . Since qb (q) is decreasing in q, the clearing condition (18) holds with equality and η equates supply and demand. Note that contagion exists even in the single-country case: A realization ε above θ * will drive the whole economy into nancial crisis with downwards-spiralling re sale prices.
As a result, all poor investors have to pledge a larger proportion of their investments as collateral. Indeed, the multiplier eect at the threshold realization, θ * , tends to innity.
Moreover, times of crisis are characterized by liquidity hoarding and a higher cost of external nance (as in Diamond and Rajan, 2011).
Competitive equilibrium
Consider, next, the determination of speculators' ex-ante choice of liquidity L S when there is no government intervention. Let be the probability of crisis (for a generic crisis threshold θ * ). Then, in a competitive equilibrium, expected trading prots must be zero and the return on liquidity therefore equals its opportunity cost, namely, the return on the linear technology, ρ 0 . Hence, the crisis threshold θ * S in a competitive equilibrium is determined by
and the liquidity supply is implicitly given by (20) . We thus obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The competitive probability of nancial crisis is strictly positive at
Proof. Immediate.
Speculators lose money unless there is a nancial crisis because the rate of return on storage is not sucient to cover the cost of providing liquidity. In that respect, nancial crises are part of the normal functioning of a competitive economy (see also Gorton and Huang, 2004, or Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2013).
Welfare
Suppose now that the government is the sole supplier of liquidity, L G ≤ T . As in the previous section, we map these quantities into crisis thresholds:
The government operates like a welfare-oriented speculator, using its liquidity to purchase investment goods on the re sale market and provide funding to poor investors, at market GNP (see Fed Statistics, 2014). In principle, the government could employ its liquidity in other ways, for example, by directly injecting equity into the nancial sector, or by assuming part of its liabilities. In a companion paper (Guembel and Sussman, 2010), we analysed such alternative policies. We show that the basic mechanism whereby supplying liquidity can increase the crisis threshold, does not change, which justies the focus of this paper.
Trading prots net out against the cost of funding the provision of liquidity. Hence, the budget surplus z,
is distributed back via lump-sum taxes. Let the expected surplus, as a function of the crisis threshold, be Z (θ * G ). It can be decomposed into trading prots and the cost of funding liquidity:
Next, we calculate the investor's expected before-tax consumption, conditional on θ (taking conditional expectations over c ∈ {c (q) , c (q)} given by (12) and (15)):
Taking expectations over θ yields expected (pre-tax) consumption, denoted by the function C (θ * G ):
Dierentiating with respect to liquidity (expressed in terms of the crisis threshold, θ * G ) we
Intuitively, by providing extra liquidity, the government can shift the crisis threshold rightwards and raise the θ * G + ε realization (with density 1/Θ) out of crisis. There are θ * G + ε poor investors in that realization, whose deadweight losses from external nance fall from l (q c ) to l (q n ). Notice that the higher re sale price would relieve all poor investors (not just the extra ε) from higher collateral and the greater deadweight loss of external nance. Clearly, expected pre-tax consumption has increasing marginal returns in liquidity supply: The more liquidity provided, the more severe the potential nancial crisis that is avoided at the margin. This is a generic property of the market for liquidity due to the downward spiral in re sales prices and collateral requirements triggered by a small shock. It is also a key driver behind the main results in this paper.
Our analysis is complicated by the fact that, while the function , that
We can now dene the social welfare function as the sum of pre-tax consumption and the distributed budget surplus,
The rst line in (25) captures the marginal eect of liquidity on private welfare, as explained above. The marginal social value of liquidity is derived by adding the change in trading prots (second line) and the increase in the cost of funding liquidity (third line).
Before deriving the government's optimal policy, consider how public and private liquidity interact. From (21) , it is clear that private liquidity supply will adjust to maintain a constant crisis probability. It follows that when θ * G < θ * S , any public liquidity injection fully crowds out a corresponding amount of private liquidity (for a related result see Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2011). Public liquidity therefore has no welfare eect up to the point that private liquidity is fully crowded out and the crisis probability drops below ψ e . In that case, the government becomes the sole liquidity provider.
Proposition 2 below demonstrates that (using Lemma 3) the cost of liquidity provision does not reverse its positive welfare eect.
Proposition 2. If θ * T > θ * S , the government's optimal policy is to provide public liquidity up to the corner solution, such that the shock that can be withstood is θ * T or Θ. If θ * T ≤ θ * S , the injection of public liquidity fully crowds out (one for one) private liquidity so that total liquidity is not aected and L G = 0 is (weakly) optimal.
If a country's tax capacity is below competitive liquidity, then public policy is impotent. If the tax capacity is high (such that T > L S ), then the government should inject liquidity to raise total liquidity above the competitive level. Note that this result does not rely on assumption (2); the competitive supply of liquidity is always sub-optimal, even without that assumption. The contribution of assumption (2) is to guarantee that SW > 0 globally so that the optimal policy is to inject liquidity up to the corner of either T or Θ, whichever binds rst (the probability of crisis drops to zero in the latter case).
Since the optimal policy is always to inject some liquidity, one should consider assumption (2) as a simplication that saves the eort of dealing separately with both cases above.
That simplication is particularly helpful in the two-country case.
5
Two countries: ex-post equilibrium
In a two-country setting, policy is two dimensional: Governments have to decide how much public liquidity to inject and what restrictions, if any, to impose on the free ow of liquidity, both public and private. The two dimensions are independent; we do not rule out the possibility that a government injects liquidity that is allowed to ow freely across borders, nor do we rule out the possibility that a government imposes (at t = 0) rules and regulations that restrict the ow of private liquidity (at t = 1) out of the country, where it is parked. (As noted in Section 2, liquidity must be held inside a country, so any outow is subject to the rules and regulations of the hosting country.) The incentives In a two-country setting, a nancial crisis may be either regional or systemic. In the former case the re sale price in, say, country A drops to q c , while the re sale price in country B remains at q n . In the latter case, the re sale price in both countries drops to q c . Obviously, it is also possible that there will be no crisis in either country. Denote by L i the amount of domestic liquidity in country i (i.e. liquidity restricted from owing out of country i) and by L F the amount of free-to-ow liquidity (whether public or private).
Like in the single-country case, it is convenient to characterize the equilibrium in terms of crisis thresholds: Each country has exclusive access to its own domestic liquidity. Hence, country A, say, is immune from nancial crisis as long as its own realization, θ A , is smaller than the shock θ * A that can be withstood using only domestic liquidity (θ A is to the left of the vertical θ * A line in Figure 3) . Potentially, country A can avoid a crisis as long as the residual demand of both countries, after exhausting all domestic liquidity, Σ (θ i − θ * i ), is smaller than the shock θ * F that the free-to-ow liquidity can absorb (θ A + θ B is below the downward-sloping θ * -diagonal in Figure 3 
(RC-i) There is a regional crisis in country i (q i = q
(SC) There is a systemic crisis (q A = q B = q c ) otherwise.
Against the problem of idle liquidity one has to weigh the problem of cross-country contagion. Consider a realization (θ A , θ B ) in the N C region, just below the θ * -diagonal and just to the right of the θ * A -vertical in Figure 3 . Now suppose that the country-B shock increases enough to push both countries into the systemic-crisis area, SC. Country A would now suer a crisis, even though its domestic shock is the same; A is aected by contagion from B. Note that country A could have fended o the crisis by making some of the free-to-ow liquidity domestic and thereby preventing it from owing towards country B. This corresponds to a rightward shift of the vertical θ * A line, keeping all else equal. This, of course, exacerbates the idle liquidity problem for country B. Clearly, an exact welfare evaluation is required in order to determine which eect dominates.
In the single-country case, the probability of nancial crisis conditional on the realization of θ is either zero or one. This is no longer the case in the two-country setting because, conditional on the realization of θ A , the incidence of crisis still depends on the realization of θ B , such that, conditional on θ A alone, the probability of crisis for country A may be between zero and one. This conditional probability plays a central role in our welfare analysis. Let θ ≡ (θ * A , θ * B , θ * ) be the allocation of domestic and free-to-ow liq-uidity in both countries (note that θ * F is dened as a residual). Then, using Proposition 3, the probability of a country-i crisis conditional on its own realization of θ i is
We also dene the unconditional probability of crisis in each country as
Let ψ A∨B (θ) be the probability of nancial crisis in either country A or country B (or both). From Figure 3 it is clear that ψ A∨B (θ) can be written as
It is obvious that ψ A∨B (θ) ≥ ψ A (θ), with the following implication.
Fact 1. The ex ante expected return on domestic liquidity is lower than the ex ante expected return on free-to-ow liquidity, because the latter can prot from crisis in both countries, while the former can prot only from domestic crisis. 6 
Ex ante equilibrium
In our model, governments only consider the well-being of their own citizens, which raises the possibility of coordination failure, where governments ignore the negative eect of fragmentation on their neighbour -a beggar-thy-neighbour problem. As explained in Section 2, the non-cooperative game between both countries is played as follows (within t = 0): First, both governments make a simultaneous decision about (i) the amount of public liquidity that each supplies, (ii) the allocation of that liquidity to free-to-ow and domestic liquidity, and (iii) the rules that apply to private liquidity, whether free to ow or domestic. Speculators then decide how much private liquidity, if any, they supply. At 6 Note that, strictly speaking, the probability of crisis at the threshold θ i = θ * i is equal to zero. In the treatment below, the increase in the probability of crisis, moving just across the θ * i realization, will play an important role. It is therefore notationally more convenient to dene the function ψ i (θ |θ i ) according to (26) . Since the imprecision concerns an atomistic point, the integration and thus the overall probability of crisis are completely unaected. this point, θ is determined. We analyse Nash equilibria in this game. We also analyse the socially optimal policy, that is that policy which maximizes the joint welfare of both countries. A Nash equilibrium is deemed a coordination failure if it deviates from the social optimum.
Using the conditional probability function, ψ i (θ |θ i ), we can derive the expected pretax consumption, C i (θ), similarly to the single-country case:
We also calculate the expected budget surplus Z i (θ) as in (23), using the liquidity injections by the domestic government, L G,i :
where R ∈ {i, i ∨ j} denotes the region of deployment for public liquidity. Total welfare is just
6.1
No capacity for public liquidity, T i = 0
We start with the simple case in which the governments have no capacity to supply public liquidity so that the only decisions that they make is whether to allow private liquidity to ow freely across borders. It follows from Fact 1 that the decision is binary: If some private liquidity is allowed to ow freely and the rest is restricted, the restricted part would earn a lower rate of return and attract no funds. Each country's decision thus reduces to either restricting or allowing free ow of the entire supply of private liquidity.
We start the analysis by demonstrating that coordination is not an issue in the present case.
Proposition 4. When governments have no capacity to provide liquidity (i.e. T i = 0), the socially optimal policy (whether fragmentation or free to ow) is a weakly dominant strategy.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we analyse the best response of country A to a country B policy. If country B allows the free ow of liquidity, country A is indierent between fragmentation and free ow, since both options lead to the same equilibrium allocation of θ SF ≡ 0, 0, θ * SF . SF indicates that the liquidity allocation is one where all liquidity is supplied competitively by speculators (hence S) and is free-to-ow (hence F ). Clearly,
Trivially, this is the allocation if country A chooses a free-to-ow policy. If country A responds with fragmentation, speculators will have to decide whether to park their liquidity in country B, from where it can ow out to country A, or in country A, out of which it cannot ow. By Fact 1, they would prefer the former option, leaving country A with zero domestic liquidity and parking θ * SF in country B, free to ow.
Alternatively, consider the case in which country B imposes restrictions on liquidity outows. If country A responds with a free-to-ow policy, the allocation, again, is θ SF .
If, however, country A responds with a fragmentation policy, the equilibrium allocation would be θ
, where SR indicates competitive liquidity supply with restrictions on ows. Like before,
Due to the symmetry of both θ SF and θ SR , whatever policy maximizes country A's welfare also maximizes country-B's welfare.
The next step is to nd the optimally coordinated policy through an exact welfare accounting.
Proposition 5. When governments have no capacity to provide liquidity (T i = 0), the socially optimal policy is to allow the free ow of liquidity across borders.
Proof see Appendix. Since, in the T i = 0 case, fragmentation has no eect on the probability of nancial crisis, we interpret the result here as highlighting the pure eect of fragmentation.
Moreover, from the discussion in Section 4.2, we know that welfare is decreasing in the scale of the shocks that triggered the crises, a property that carries over to the two-country case. The pure fragmentation eect is therefore unambiguously negative.
Taken together, Propositions 4 and 5 lead to another insight: Fragmentation is not even unilaterally attractive when governments have no capacity to provide their own liquidity. In such a case, governments rely on private speculators to supply liquidity and have no incentive to impose regulations on them that would diminish the protability of the liquidity-provision business. The result is reversed in the next section.
7 Hence, the point
lies below the diagonal (above the diagonal in the ψ e ≤ 1/2 case). Had it been on the diagonal (and in the middle, as implied by symmetry), the triangle would have been smaller in area.
High capacity of public liquidity
At the other extreme is the case in which T i is suciently high to allow governments to crowd out completely any private liquidity 8 and become the sole provider of liquidity.
Although the argument for a binary decision, presented in Section 6.1, is no longer valid (since the government may wish to keep part of its liquidity domestically and allow the rest to ow freely, the former part bearing a lower rate of return relative to the latter), we stay with the binary case. This is both for clarity of exposition and because the propensity for a corner solution is implied by Proposition 9 below. We rst focus on the case in which both countries have the same tax capacity T ≡ T A = T B . The following Proposition demonstrates a complete reversal of Proposition 4 above. Proposition 6. When private liquidity is fully crowded out so that the only available liquidity is supplied by the governments, fragmentation is a dominant strategy and a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof see Appendix. Figure 5 develops the intuition behind Proposition 6. Suppose country B adopts a free-to-ow policy. If country A responds with a free-to-ow policy, then the resulting allocation is θ T F ≡ (0, 0, 2θ * T ), where T stands for tax capacity and F stands for free to ow. Alternatively, if country A responds with a fragmentation policy, the resulting allocation is θ T RF ≡ (θ * T , 0, 2θ * T ). As a result, country A can avoid a nancial crisis for any realization θ A ≤ θ * T to the left of the θ * T vertical. Moreover, since country B still allows liquidity outows, country A can avoid crisis whenever θ A + θ B ≤ 2θ * T , below the 2θ * T diagonal. Namely, the probability of crisis falls by the entire dark-shaded trapezoid, without exposing the realization in the light-shaded triangle to crisis. If, on the other hand, country B adopts a fragmentation policy and country A responds with a free-to-ow policy, realizations within the dark-shaded trapezoid expose country A to contagion from B. It follows that, regardless of country B's decision, a fragmentation policy by country A reduces its probability of crisis. The formal proof requires a full welfare accounting that takes into consideration the drop in the government's trading prots due to the lower probability of crisis. The latter eect is, however, dominated.
The potential for coordination failure is clear: The unilateral incentive for each country is to beggar its neighbour by keeping all the liquidity that it supplies domestically, ignoring the idle liquidity problem that it imposes on its neighbour. However, in equilibrium, when country B also implements the dominating fragmentation strategy, the allocation 8 Note that full crowding out may take place even at very low levels of T if ψ e is suciently close to one. 
, with zero free-to-ow liquidity. As a result, country A can no longer benet from an inow of liquidity from country B, particularly for realizations within the light-shaded triangle, where liquidity remains idle in country B. To pin down that failure, we demonstrate that fragmentation is only a socially optimal policy for low levels of θ * T . Since a free-to-ow policy is otherwise socially optimal and fragmentation the unique equilibrium, there is coordination failure.
Proposition 7. When private liquidity is fully crowded out, the socially optimal policy is to allow (public) liquidity to ow freely for any
. Otherwise, fragmentation is socially optimal for small values of θ * T (below a certain threshold).
Proof see Appendix
Two points deserve some elaboration. First, fragmentation is an optimal policy only for low levels of liquidity. At low values of θ * T , a systemic crisis is the likely outcome, with or without fragmentation. Fragmentation makes a dierence only for low country-A realizations. Conditional on a low country-A realization, fragmentation can avoid contagion even for high country-B realizations (a high probability event), but would induce an idle-liquidity problem only for low country-B realizations (a low probability event); see the dark-shaded trapezoid and the light shaded triangle of Figure 5 once again. So fragmentation is socially optimal. Second, comparing the results in this section to those in the previous one, the beggar-thy-neighbour problem arises when liquidity is publicly provided. Then, fragmentation serves as a means of grabbing more liquidity to service the domestic market. Since the total amount of liquidity is given, this grabbing game may end with more idle liquidity, which is socially sub-optimal for high levels of θ * T . In contrast, when liquidity is provided privately, fragmentation directly decreases the protability of liquidity provision, which is either ineective because speculators can nd a way around it or it decreases the supply of liquidity to the fragmented economy.
It is interesting to extend the above welfare analysis to the case in which countries do not have a symmetric tax capacity. We thus distinguish between country-specic thresholds θ * T A and θ * T B
, dened by (22) , using country-specic levels of tax capacity, T A and T B . Suppose total public liquidity is high enough so that private liquidity is fully crowded out. We can then demonstrate the following result. Proposition 8. Suppose the sum of both countries' tax capacities T A + T B is constant. Country A's benet from coordinating to pool liquidity with country B is decreasing in A's tax capacity. Moreover, there are parameters such that when A's tax capacity is suciently high, it is better o not coordinating in pooling liquidity, even though doing so would maximize joint welfare.
Proof see Appendix.
This proposition shows that the benets to pooling do not accrue irrespective of tax capacity. A country with high tax capacity benets relatively little from pooling with a country with low tax capacity; the richer country suers only a mild idle liquidity problem, since the country with little ability to inject public funds will rarely be able to help. On the other hand, when liquidity is pooled, the richer country suers severely from contagion, since the poor country will frequently need to draw on its liquidity. Even though joint welfare may be improved from pooling, the richer country may not benet from it. Getting it to agree to pool liquidity may therefore require a lump sum transfer from the poor country.
The above result relates to the recent debate on creating a European banking union.
Such a union has as its aim (among other things) to pool resources to insure deposits at a European level rather than at a national level. One reason for the drive towards such a union is to ensure that a country's banking system can be rescued, even if locally available funds are insucient. This issue has come up in the recent European debt crisis, where countries such as Ireland and Cyprus did not have sucient (sovereign) debt capacity to guarantee the debts of their local banks. This situation is not unlike the case in our model, where tax capacity only allows a country to withstand a shock up to a certain boundary. The process of implementing a banking union has encountered resistance from the richer EU countries, notably Germany. Our model provides a rationale for the dierence in attitudes towards the pooling of resources. A country with a high tax capacity (say Germany) would signicantly increase its risk of being subject to contagion from a country with lower tax capacity (e.g. Spain) if both countries agree to pool funds.
The upside for Germany would be generated in those states of the world where Spain's tax capacity would be able to rescue German banks, an event that is perceived to be unlikely, given the two countries' relative tax capacities.
This discussion takes for granted that the pooled funds are allocated by a market mechanism, that is, funds ow to where re sales prices are lowest. Although pooled funds may not literally be allocated by a market mechanism in the above example, the outcome would be the same if countries employ the simple ex post allocation rule by which a country experiencing a liquidity shortage has priority access to pooled funds. We return to the question of the optimal ex post allocation of funds in Section 7.
6.3
A mix of private and public liquidity
Consider now the case where the governments can provide some liquidity (i.e. θ *
but not enough to fully crowd out private speculators. Note that if public liquidity were free to ow, it would directly compete with private liquidity and crowd out the latter, one for one. When tax capacity is insucient to replace all private liquidity, public free-toow liquidity is useless. We therefore focus on the case of domestic public liquidity. Since domestic liquidity earns a lower expected rate of return relative to free-to-ow liquidity, public and private liquidity become imperfect substitutes. This raises the possibility that injections of public liquidity crowd out private liquidity only partially, leading to an increase in the total liquidity.
To see why, consider Figure 3 again, except that we now add the information that θ * A and θ * B are public and θ * F is private. The amount of the latter is determined from ψ A∨B (θ) = ψ e . Let country A inject some additional domestic public liquidity, increasing θ * A . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that one-for-one crowding out took place. Since the extra liquidity of country-A is not available to country B, the RC − B region would expand, increasing the probability of crisis in either country so that ψ A∨B (θ) > ψ e . This cannot be an equilibrium. Instead, the private liquidity supply would increase, bringing its rate of return back to the competitive level. Hence, an increase in θ * A would increase θ * . Note, however, that one-to-one crowding out is possible if the RC − B region is empty (i.e. when θ * A > θ * − Θ). Obviously, public liquidity injections would then be useless. From now on, we therefore focus on the case in which regional crisis may occur and partial crowding-out is possible. Hence, let θ T S be an allocation of liquidity, with both government and speculative liquidity and non-empty regional crisis areas:
We can now formally calculate the exact eect of domestic liquidity on total liquidity, using (27) and ψ A∨B θ T S = ψ e :
Welfare in country i is given by (28), (29) and (30) . The budget surplus (29) can be rewritten using the fact that free-to-ow liquidity is supplied competitively and that all public liquidity is domestic and therefore L G,i = θ *
To analyse the incentive of, say, country A to inject domestic liquidity, we calculate the derivative
The rst two terms capture the eect of a change in θ * A (holding θ * constant) and can be interpreted as a pure fragmentation eect. Using (28), we can derive
The derivative has a simple geometric interpretation: By injecting domestic liquidity, the government can decrease the probability of nancial crisis for the marginal state, θ * A (with density 1/Θ) from ψ A θ T S |θ * A to zero, with a proportional decrease in the deadweight cost of external nance, ∆. This eect is always positive, which generalizes the result of Proposition 6 for the case of interim levels of fragmentation.
Next, we analyse the welfare implications of increasing the total liquidity supply through partial crowding out:
This derivative also has a simple geometric interpretation: When the θ * diagonal shifts rightwards by dθ * , the conditional probability of crisis for any realization within the set
is the probability measure of that set and
is the average magnitude of a realization within that set. Also, when the θ * diagonal shifts rightwards, the N C region expands rightwards, so the conditional probability of crisis for a marginal realization θ * − θ * B + ε falls from one to ψ A θ T S |θ * − θ * B (θ * − θ * B ). ∆ has the usual interpretation.
These positive eects have to be weighed against the increased cost of supplying domestic liquidity. This is done in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. i) When there is a mix of public and private liquidity and when the regional crisis areas are non-empty, the injection of public domestic liquidity is a dominant strategy, namely
(ii) Partial crowding out strengthens the incentive to supply public domestic liquidity, namely
It follows that, in absence of coordination, each country would use its tax capacity to the limit and inject domestic liquidity all the way up to the θ * T constraint. Such a policy has two eects: First, it increases the degree of fragmentation. Second, it increases the total supply of liquidity due to the fact that public liquidity is subsidized and only partially crowds out private liquidity. It is clear from the previous discussion that fragmentation has a negative spillover eect on the neighbour country. However, fragmentation is also a by-product if a country with limited tax capacity wishes to increase the total liquidity supply. The latter constitutes a positive spillover eect. The next proposition shows that, on balance, an uncoordinated equilibrium is (weakly) a beggar-thy-neighbour policy: Proposition 10. An uncoordinated level of fragmentation is weakly suboptimal: the governments allocate (weakly) too little free-to-ow liquidity.
Proof. Since the uncoordinated equilibrium is, in general, fragmentation to the limit, the uncoordinated equilibrium cannot fail by providing too little fragmentation (i.e.
too much free-to-ow public liquidity). Clearly, full fragmentation may be a sociallyoptimal policy (see Proposition 7) but it can fail by providing too much fragmentation (i.e. too little free-to-ow public liquidity). For example, consider a situation where the socially optimal policy for θ * = 2θ * T (and no private liquidity) is zero fragmentation (see Proposition 7). Clearly, there exist a ψ e such that, with uncoordinated governments fragmenting to the θ * T limit, private liquidity is positive, θ * = 2θ * T + ε, but small enough to be fully crowded out if the governments coordinate to avoid fragmentation. Namely, liquidity injection is eective (see Proposition 2). Due to continuity, there exists an ε small enough to make such a coordination a Pareto improvement.
It follows that, although we have shown that the pure welfare eect of fragmentation is negative (with a given probability of crisis, fragmentation trades of a mild nancial crisis for a severe one; see Proposition 5), governments may still have a role in injecting liquidity in the market. Liquidity is a public good, under-provided in a competitive equilibrium (see Proposition 2) . Moreover, in some cases, injecting liquidity exclusively for domestic use is the optimal policy. The case for such policy is enhanced by the partial crowding out eect (see result ii) in Proposition 9). Yet, in the absence of coordination, governments would implement too much fragmentation, leading to beggar thy neighbor liquidity policies.
7
Ex post contingent allocation of liquidity So far, coordination has meant that both countries reach an ex-ante agreement regarding liquidity injections and liquidity ow restrictions. By assumption, they stick to that agreement ex post. In this section we adopt an alternative assumption, that the two countries can reach an ex ante enforceable agreement about the ex post allocation of liquidity contingent on the realization (θ A , θ B ). We maintain the assumption that total liquidity, θ * , is predetermined (due to the non-reversible nature of the investment in the alternative linear technology). The analysis is presented for the sake of completeness, but also because it highlights the pivotal role that increasing returns to liquidity play in our analysis: It is optimal to direct liquidity to treat the country that is suering the higher realization of poor investors (provided that it can be rescued). The results bear a similarity to the triage rules of emergency medicine: Prioritize treatment to the more badly injured, provided that there are sucient resources to save them. However, if they cannot be saved, one should leave the badly injured to their fate and treat the less badly injured instead. More accurately, we provide the following proposition.
Proposition 11. Under the ex post optimal allocation of liquidity, both countries should be rescued if possible, that is if
Otherwise, if θ i + θ j > θ * , country i should be rescued from crisis (by the injection of an amount of liquidity equal to θ A (1 − π) q n b (q n ) , exactly) while country j should be allocated , and either the rescue of country j is infeasible
or the rescue of country j is feasible, θ j ≤ θ * , but
A systemic crisis is unavoidable if for both i = A, B, θ i > θ * . Proof see Appendix.
The various crisis regimes are described in Figure 6 .
Two points deserve a brief elaboration. First, in the absence of strong commitment, it is hard to see how the ex post optimal allocation of liquidity can be implemented, which is why (to the best of our knowledge) it is not implemented in reality. This is because it requires, in some cases, a country that has enough liquidity to fend o a crisis to sacrice itself (from an ex post point of view) to save its badly injured neighbour. The diculty in implementation justies the attention given to the case analyzed in Section 6, where countries may coordinate ex ante on whether or not to pool funds but will ex post allocate the pooled funds with priority to that country experiencing a liquidity shortage. Perhaps the result can provide a rationale for an international crisis management institution (such as the IMF or the ECB) that centralizes the allocation of liquidity ex post. Second, the result vividly illustrates why the standard prescription of allowing goods to ow across markets until the prices are equal across countries does not apply in our model: Under increasing returns to scale, such a rule does not implement economic eciency.
Conclusions
The conclusion that fragmentation is a good policy seems straightforward from the ex post point of view of a country that suered or is about to suer a nancial crisis due to contagion from abroad. We argue that things are much less clear-cut when fragmentation is evaluated from the point of view of international coordination, say, from the point of view of the IMF or the ECB. For then, the straightforward advantage of unilateral fragmentation may turn into coordination failure, just as in the old beggar-thy-neighbour analysis. The reason why the coordinated analysis diers from the unilateral one is that it considers not just the event of contagion, but also the event where a country can be rescued from crisis if it can access the idle liquidity of its neighbor, that is when the market is not fragmented. We show that the net welfare eect of pure fragmentation is negative because it trades o relatively mild nancial crises for more severe ones. We emphasize that speculators who provide market liquidity do not internalize its full social value and, as a result, liquidity is underprovided in a competitive equilibrium, just like any other public good. Yet, that the market fails in providing sucient liquidity does not imply that other aspects of market allocation, such as the tendency of goods to ow towards the highest bidder, are necessarily sub optimal. Liquidity policy has two dimensions: how much liquidity to provide and whether to impose restrictions on free ow. In some cases, the optimal policy is to inject as much liquidity as possible and to allow it to ow freely.
Unfortunately, when the liquidity market is dominated by public players, the temptation to fragment unilaterally is also the strongest, which is when the role of coordination bodies such as the IMF or ECB is so critical.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Rewrite the participation constraint (14) as the function f (b, q) = (y 2 + y 3 ) − δ (y 2 + y 3 ) q − (1 − π) b (y 2 + y 3 − q) , c is determined by the intersection of these graphs.
Since b < 0, it is unique. Now, condition 4 guarantees that f (1, q n ) > 0 and hence lies below the f = 0 graph. Notice that the location the b (q) curve depends on w. Let W (y 2 , y 3 , δ, π) be the w such that the b (q) passes through point A. Since an increase w shifts the graph of the b (q) function leftwards, q c < q n for w > W (y 2 , y 3 , δ, π) and the feasibility constraint (10) does not bind. Since b < 0, it does not bind for any q ∈ [q c , q n ] .
Proof of Lemma 3
Using the denition of b (q) in (11) it can be shown that
Hence, and using the denition the l (q) we derive: T < θ * S so that the speculators are still active in the market, their zero-prot condition must be satised and the probability of crisis is ψ e , independently of θ * G : there is one-to-one crowding out of private liquidity by public liquidity.
Proof of Proposition 5
Since, in this case, the governments have no scal activity, Z i (θ) = 0 and welfare reduces to expected consumption (28) . A free-to-ow policy strictly dominates fragmentation if and only if (regardless of ψ e 1/2)
We can substitute the following into the right-hand side of the inequality:
Doing the same decomposition for θ A l (q c ), and canceling out against equal terms in SW i θ SF as specied in equation (28) we get a simplied condition for the dominance of the free-to-ow policy:
